


# Cache-Timing Attack Against HQC

Chitchanok Chuengsatiansup

The University of Melbourne, Australia

# About Me

# About Me



# About Me



# About Me



# Efficient and Secure Cryptosystems


# Efficient and Secure Cryptosystems

efficient implementation

cryptanalysis


security

# Efficient and Secure Cryptosystems






# Efficient and Secure Cryptosystems




# Efficient and Secure Cryptosystems



Joint work with Senyang Huang, Rui Qi Sim, Qian Guo, and Thomas Johansson



# Optimization Strategy

# Optimization Strategy




# Optimization Strategy


Home



# Optimization Strategy




# Optimization Strategy



# Optimization Strategy


- Exchanging products at a supermarket shortens customers' time






# Optimization Strategy

- Exchanging products at a supermarket shortens customers' time
- Storing food in a fridge to avoid frequent visits to a supermarket



# Optimization Strategy


- Exchanging products at a supermarket shortens customers' time
- Storing food in a fridge to avoid frequent visits to a supermarket
- Observing shopping patterns can deduce food menus or recipes



# Speeding Up Performance

# Speeding Up Performance


Processor



Memory



# Speeding Up Performance

- Utilize locality
  - ▶ spatial: divide memory into **lines**
  - ▶ temporal: store recently used lines in **cache**




# Speeding Up Performance

- Utilize locality
  - ▶ spatial: divide memory into **lines**
  - ▶ temporal: store recently used lines in **cache**



# Speeding Up Performance


- Utilize locality
  - ▶ spatial: divide memory into **lines**
  - ▶ temporal: store recently used lines in **cache**
- Check if data is in cache
  - ▶ **cache hit**: serve data from cache
  - ▶ **cache miss**: get data from memory and put in cache



# Speeding Up Performance

- Utilize locality
  - ▶ spatial: divide memory into **lines**
  - ▶ temporal: store recently used lines in **cache**
- Check if data is in cache
  - ▶ **cache hit**: serve data from cache
  - ▶ **cache miss**: get data from memory and put in cache


Processor






# Speeding Up Performance

- Utilize locality
  - ▶ spatial: divide memory into **lines**
  - ▶ temporal: store recently used lines in **cache**
- Check if data is in cache
  - ▶ **cache hit**: serve data from cache
  - ▶ **cache miss**: get data from memory and put in cache





# Speeding Up Performance

- Utilize locality
  - ▶ spatial: divide memory into **lines**
  - ▶ temporal: store recently used lines in **cache**
- Check if data is in cache
  - ▶ **cache hit**: serve data from cache
  - ▶ **cache miss**: get data from memory and put in cache




# Speeding Up Performance

- Utilize locality
  - ▶ spatial: divide memory into **lines**
  - ▶ temporal: store recently used lines in **cache**
- Check if data is in cache
  - ▶ **cache hit**: serve data from cache
  - ▶ **cache miss**: get data from memory and put in cache
- Share cache
  - ▶ improve performance of multi-core processors



# Maintaining Consistency



Processor



Memory


# Maintaining Consistency

- Memory and cache can be inconsistent
  - ▶ rare but possible





# Maintaining Consistency

- Memory and cache can be inconsistent
  - ▶ rare but possible
- Solution: flush cache contents
  - ▶ ensure next load to serve from memory




# Maintaining Consistency

- Memory and cache can be inconsistent
  - ▶ rare but possible
- Solution: flush cache contents
  - ▶ ensure next load to serve from memory



# Maintaining Consistency



- Memory and cache can be inconsistent
  - ▶ rare but possible
- Solution: flush cache contents
  - ▶ ensure next load to serve from memory







# Maintaining Consistency

- Memory and cache can be inconsistent
  - ▶ rare but possible
- Solution: flush cache contents
  - ▶ ensure next load to serve from memory





# Flush + Reload [GBK11, YF14]

Processor





# Flush + Reload [GBK11, YF14]

Processor





# Flush + Reload [GBK11, YF14]

- **Flush** memory line
- Wait (victim executes)
- Measure time to **Reload** line
  - ▶ slow → no victim access
  - ▶ fast → victim accessed
- (Repeat)





# Flush + Reload [GBK11, YF14]

- **Flush** memory line
- Wait (victim executes)
- Measure time to **Reload** line
  - ▶ slow → no victim access
  - ▶ fast → victim accessed
- (Repeat)





# Flush + Reload [GBK11, YF14]

- **Flush** memory line
- Wait (victim executes)
- Measure time to **Reload** line
  - ▶ slow → no victim access
  - ▶ fast → victim accessed
- (Repeat)




# Flush + Reload [GBK11, YF14]

- **Flush** memory line
- Wait (victim executes)
- Measure time to **Reload** line
  - ▶ slow → no victim access
  - ▶ fast → victim accessed
- (Repeat)



# Flush + Reload [GBK11, YF14]



- **Flush** memory line
- Wait (victim executes)
- Measure time to **Reload** line
  - ▶ slow → no victim access
  - ▶ fast → victim accessed
- (Repeat)





# Flush + Reload [GBK11, YF14]



- **Flush** memory line
- Wait (victim executes)
- Measure time to **Reload** line
  - ▶ slow → no victim access
  - ▶ fast → victim accessed
- (Repeat)




# Flush + Reload [GBK11, YF14]

- **Flush** memory line
- Wait (victim executes)
- Measure time to **Reload** line
  - ▶ slow → no victim access
  - ▶ fast → victim accessed


● (Repeat)



# Flush + Reload: in action



# Flush + Reload: in action




# Flush + Reload: pros & cons

- + Simple
- + Very few false positive
- + Resolution of memory line


# Flush + Reload: pros & cons

- + Simple
- + Very few false positive
- + Resolution of memory line
  - Only work with shared memory
  - Require flush instruction

# Set Associative Caches




# Set Associative Caches






# Set Associative Caches

- Memory lines map to **cache sets**




# Set Associative Caches

- Memory lines map to **cache sets**
- Each line maps to one particular set and can be stored in any of its ways




# Set Associative Caches

- Memory lines map to **cache sets**
- Each line maps to one particular set and can be stored in any of its ways
- Multiple lines map to the same set





# Set Associative Caches

- Memory lines map to **cache sets**
- Each line maps to one particular set and can be stored in any of its ways
- Multiple lines map to the same set
- When cache miss and that set is full, one of the lines in that set is **evicted**




# Set Associative Caches

- Memory lines map to **cache sets**
- Each line maps to one particular set and can be stored in any of its ways
- Multiple lines map to the same set
- When cache miss and that set is full, one of the lines in that set is **evicted**




# Set Associative Caches

- Memory lines map to **cache sets**
- Each line maps to one particular set and can be stored in any of its ways
- Multiple lines map to the same set
- When cache miss and that set is full, one of the lines in that set is **evicted**




# Set Associative Caches

- Memory lines map to **cache sets**
- Each line maps to one particular set and can be stored in any of its ways
- Multiple lines map to the same set
- When cache miss and that set is full, one of the lines in that set is **evicted**



# Set Associative Caches



- Memory lines map to **cache sets**
- Each line maps to one particular set and can be stored in any of its ways
- Multiple lines map to the same set
- When cache miss and that set is full, one of the lines in that set is **evicted**







# Prime + Probe [OST05, Per05]

# Prime + Probe [OST05, Per05]





# Prime + Probe [OST05, Per05]

- (Allocate cache-sized memory buffer)
- **Prime**: access all lines in buffer  
→ fill cache with attacker's data
- Wait (victim executes)  
→ may evict some cache lines
- **Probe**: measure time to access buffer
  - ▶ slow → cache line evicted
  - ▶ fast → no victim access





# Prime + Probe [OST05, Per05]

- (Allocate cache-sized memory buffer)
- **Prime**: access all lines in buffer  
→ fill cache with attacker's data
- Wait (victim executes)  
→ may evict some cache lines
- **Probe**: measure time to access buffer
  - ▶ slow → cache line evicted
  - ▶ fast → no victim access





# Prime + Probe [OST05, Per05]

- (Allocate cache-sized memory buffer)
- **Prime**: access all lines in buffer  
→ fill cache with attacker's data
- Wait (victim executes)  
→ may evict some cache lines
- **Probe**: measure time to access buffer
  - ▶ slow → cache line evicted
  - ▶ fast → no victim access




# Prime + Probe [OST05, Per05]

- (Allocate cache-sized memory buffer)
- **Prime**: access all lines in buffer  
→ fill cache with attacker's data
- **Wait (victim executes)**  
→ may evict some cache lines
- **Probe**: measure time to access buffer
  - ▶ slow → cache line evicted
  - ▶ fast → no victim access





# Prime + Probe [OST05, Per05]

- (Allocate cache-sized memory buffer)
- **Prime**: access all lines in buffer  
→ fill cache with attacker's data
- Wait (victim executes)  
→ may evict some cache lines
- **Probe**: measure time to access buffer
  - ▶ slow → cache line evicted
  - ▶ fast → no victim access



# Prime + Probe [OST05, Per05]

- (Allocate cache-sized memory buffer)
- **Prime**: access all lines in buffer  
→ fill cache with attacker's data
- Wait (victim executes)  
→ may evict some cache lines
- **Probe**: measure time to access buffer
  - ▶ slow → cache line evicted
  - ▶ fast → no victim access





# Limitations of Cache-Timing Attacks

# Limitations of Cache-Timing Attacks

- Provide cache/memory access patterns
  - ▶ might not reveal actual secret values

# Limitations of Cache-Timing Attacks

- Provide cache/memory access patterns
  - ▶ might not reveal actual secret values
  
- Provide partial information
  - ▶ might not reveal the full secret key

# HQC


- HQC: Hamming Quasi Cyclic
- 4th-round candidate of the ongoing NIST PQC Standardization
- Code-based post-quantum key encapsulation mechanism (KEM)

# HQC's KEM


# HQC's KEM

Key Generation

# HQC's KEM




# HQC's KEM







# HQC's KEM




# HQC's KEM




# HQC's KEM




# HQC's KEM




# HQC's KEM



# HQC's KEM



# HQC's KEM



# Randomness



# Randomness

Encryption

# Randomness

## Encryption

$$c = m + \text{error}$$

# Randomness

## Encryption

$$c = m + \underbrace{\text{error}}_{\text{random} + \text{sk}}$$

# Randomness

Encryption

$$c = m + \underbrace{\text{error}}_{\text{random} + \text{sk}}$$

Decryption

# Randomness

Encryption

$$c = m + \underbrace{\text{error}}_{\text{random} + \text{sk}}$$

Decryption

$c$

# Randomness

Encryption

$$c = m + \underbrace{\text{error}}_{\text{random} + \text{sk}}$$

Decryption

$$c \uparrow m + \text{error}$$

# Randomness

Encryption

$$c = m + \underbrace{\text{error}}_{\text{random} + \text{sk}}$$

Decryption

$$c - \text{error}'$$

↑  
 $m + \text{error}$

# Randomness

Encryption

$$c = m + \underbrace{\text{error}}_{\text{random} + \text{sk}}$$

Decryption

$$c - \text{error}'$$

$\uparrow$   $\uparrow$

$$m + \text{error} \quad \text{sk}$$



# Randomness

Encryption

$$c = m + \underbrace{\text{error}}_{\text{random} + \text{sk}}$$

Decryption

$$m' = \underbrace{c}_{m + \text{error}} - \underbrace{\text{error}'}_{\text{sk}}$$

# Randomness

Encryption

$$c = m + \underbrace{\text{error}}_{\text{random} + \text{sk}}$$

Decryption

$$m' = \underbrace{c}_{m + \text{error}} - \underbrace{\text{error}'}_{\text{sk}}$$

$$m = m' \text{ vs } m \neq m'$$

# Randomness

## Encryption

$$c = m + \underbrace{\text{error}}_{\text{random} + \text{sk}}$$

## Decryption

$$m' = c - \text{error}'$$

$\uparrow$   $\uparrow$

$m + \text{error}$   $\text{sk}$


$m = m' \text{ vs } m \neq m'$

# Cache Line Indicator


# Cache Line Indicator



# Cache Line Indicator



# Cache Line Indicator




# Cache Line Indicator






# Cache Line Indicator



# Cache Line Indicator




# Cache Line Indicator




# Plaintext-Checking Oracle


# Plaintext-Checking Oracle




# Plaintext-Checking Oracle



# Plaintext-Checking Oracle




# Plaintext-Checking Oracle






# Our Attack


# Our Attack




# Our Attack



# Our Attack



# Our Attack



# Practical Experiment

# Practical Experiment

- Code runs inside a secure Software Guard Extensions (SGX)

# Practical Experiment

- Code runs inside a secure Software Guard Extensions (SGX)
- Assume a malicious OS under attacker's control



# Practical Experiment

- Code runs inside a secure Software Guard Extensions (SGX)
- Assume a malicious OS under attacker's control
- Use SGX-Step to single-step an SGX enclave

# Practical Experiment


- Code runs inside a secure Software Guard Extensions (SGX)
- Assume a malicious OS under attacker's control
- Use SGX-Step to single-step an SGX enclave
- Aim: detect *whether* there is an access rather than *when* it occurs

# Practical Experiment

- Code runs inside a secure Software Guard Extensions (SGX)
- Assume a malicious OS under attacker's control
- Use SGX-Step to single-step an SGX enclave
- Aim: detect *whether* there is an access rather than *when* it occurs
- Result: 99.9% accuracy

# Captured Traces

# Captured Traces



## Comparison to ground truth

- ★ true positive
- true negative
- × false positive
- ☆ speculatively accessed



## Simple analysis

- accessed
- ignore access

## Final classification

- accessed
- not accessed

# Captured Traces



## Comparison to ground truth

- ★ true positive
- true negative
- × false positive
- ☆ speculatively accessed



## Simple analysis

- accessed
- ignore access

## Final classification

- accessed
- not accessed

# Captured Traces



## Comparison to ground truth

- ★ true positive
- true negative
- × false positive
- ☆ speculatively accessed

## Simple analysis

- accessed
- ignore access

## Final classification

- accessed
- not accessed

# Summary



# Summary

- First cache-timing attack on HQC

# Summary

- First cache-timing attack on HQC
- More practical than previous timing attack (54k vs 866k queries)

# Summary

- First cache-timing attack on HQC
- More practical than previous timing attack (54k vs 866k queries)
- See paper for more details  
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/102.pdf>